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A Note on Science, Legal Research and
Artificial Intelligence
Nachshon (Sean) Goltz* & Giulia Dondoli**
“We become what we behold. We shape our tools and then our tools shape us”1
Abstract
This paper discusses the principles of scientific research and in turn review legal research that
was done using Artificial Intelligence arguing that it is the tools (Artificial Intelligence) that
take center stage while the meaning (legal research) is left back stage. In turn, this kind of
research does not adhere to the fundamentals of scientific research nor comply with scientific
and industry ethical codes.
Keywords: Science, Legal Research, Artificial Intelligence, Big Data
Introduction
Few months ago, I (the first author) was invited to a workshop around law, Big Data
and machine learning. I talked with local colleagues about my unethical experience
with an American leading university and a major legal information provider. When
they expressed their lack of surprise, I realized there was a gap between the local
norms and my expectations.
This understanding deepened and extended when one of the workshop’s participants
presented his research employing machine learning in order to measure the effect of
lawyer’s voice masculinity when saying ‘may I please the court’ on the court’s
decision. My attempt to draw attention to the problematic nature of such research,
i.e., the lack of any valuable application, was firmly rejected.
I encountered a dismissive and patronizing approach focusing on my alleged lack of
technology proficiency. I realized that when one need to establish that there is even
an issue, it means that there is a fundamental gap, much harder to explain. This gap,
in turn, mark the existence of an ethical deviation. This deviation extends beyond
the intersection of law and Artificial Intelligence to what Lipton and Steinhardt call,
“Troubling trends in machine learning scholarship”.2
The reasons for these troubling trends can be only speculated, though there are
reasons to believe they can, at least partially, be found in Ellul’s3 ‘technical
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civilization’, described by Merton in the forward to Ellul’s book as, “committed to
the quest for continually improved means to carelessly examined ends. Indeed,
technique transforms ends into means. What was once prized in its own right now
becomes worthwhile only if it helps achieve something else. And, conversely,
technique turns means into ends. ‘Know-how’ takes on an ultimate value.”4
In a previous paper, “The Work of Law in the Age of Artificial Intelligence”,5 we argued that
the research of the intersection of law and Artificial Intelligence is challenging as it is
dominated by those who research the latter. It was suggested that the intelligence being
developed at this intersection is a legal intelligence, and as such should be led by legal experts
and not computer scientists.
This paper extends this perspective by reviewing legal research that was done using Artificial
Intelligence and arguing that it is the tools (Artificial Intelligence) that take center stage while
the meaning (legal research) is left back stage. In turn, this kind of research does not adhere to
the fundamentals of scientific research nor comply with scientific and industry ethical codes.
Part I will review the basics of scientific research and research methods. Part II will
discuss Merton’s norms of scientific research followed by Part III discussing
specific aspects of research ethics and Artificial Intelligence. Part IV analyzes a few
examples of research done in the field of law using Artificial Intelligent tools, in
light of the principles outlined in Parts I, II and III. Finally, the conclusions provide
suggestions for the future.
Part I – Scientific Research
Research has been defined in a number of different ways. In a broad sense, Colibao argue that,
"the definition of research includes any gathering of data, information, and facts for the
advancement of knowledge.”6 Similarly, the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines
research in more detail as "a studious inquiry or examination; especially investigation or
experimentation aimed at the discovery and interpretation of facts, revision of accepted theories
or laws in the light of new facts, or practical application of such new or revised theories or
laws".7 Moreover, research needs to be understood as a "process of steps used to collect and
analyze information to increase our understanding of a topic or issue". It consists of three steps:
pose a question, collect data to answer the question, and present an answer to the question.8
Finally, research is also “the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications”.9
Strongly related to the term ‘research’, is the term ‘scientific method’. The scientific method
should not be viewed as a static toolkit of methods to achieve scientific research. It is instead
a set of actions, for example: “systematic observation and experimentation, inductive and
4
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deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories.”10 The popular
understanding of scientific method can be summarized as follow: scientists determine facts by
direct observation of as much data as they can gather; then they organize this data and propose
hypotheses to understand it. These hypotheses can then be tested by subsequent studies.11
The philosophical attempt to clarify the meaning of knowledge, and the methods to achieve it,
track back to ancient Greek philosophers and spans throughout human history. In the 4th
century BC, Epicurus proposed two fundamental rules to conduct an inquiry, which combined
are a unique inquiry method. There is, first, a requirement for the existence of initial concepts
to demarcate the problem, that is to say that the observer needs to be aware of empirical facts
that constitute the initial concepts. Second, there is the requirement for empirical facts to
provide a solution to the inquiry.12 In other words, after a careful observation of the empirical
facts, the scientific methods require logic to understand these facts and infer beyond what is
known, i.e. inferring what is unobserved from what can be observed. However, as Epicurus
states, before applying logical reasoning to the empirical observation, the first fundamental
steps is to understand the problem itself.13
During the scientific revolution in the 16th and 18th centuries, great minds such as Galileo
Galilei, Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton, not only greatly advanced human knowledge on
medicine, science and physic; they also reflected upon the legitimacy of scientific research and
methodology.14 Famously, Galileo Galilei developed the idea that the scientific method is
composed by three components: controlled experiments, mathematical analysis, and
conceptual investigation.15 In particular, scientific knowledge has to be built upon the interplay
of the three components and “no combination could supply the absence of any one of them.”16
The common ground of these definitions and explanation of research and scientific method is
the ‘advancement of knowledge’ and the ‘increase of understanding’ through the study,
examination or experimentation that is led by a theory, an hypothesis or a law. In his work,
Merton17 codified and crystallised these variegated set of concepts and in doing so he
highlighted the social values of scientific research.
Merton argues that science is a “deceptively inclusive word which refers to a variety of distinct
though interrelated items”. Among these items Merton counts: “(1) a set of characteristic
methods by means of which knowledge is certified; (2) a stock of accumulated knowledge
stemming from the application of these methods; (3) a set of cultural values and mores
governing the activities termed scientific; or (4) any combination of the foregoing”.18
According to Merton, the technical methods to extend the ‘certified knowledge’ are
“empirically confirmed and logically consistent predictions”. While empirical evidence is a
prerequisite for sustained true prediction; logical consistency is a prerequisite for systematic
and valid prediction. These mores, according to Merton, “possess a methodologic rationale but
they are binding, not because they are procedurally efficient, but because they are believed
10
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right and good. They are moral, not technical, prescriptions”.19 The next section discusses
Merton’s norms and highlights how scientists have been engaging with them.
Part II – Merton’s Norms and beyond
In 1942, when Merton published his well-known article on the normative structure of science,20
science was, or was perceived to be, threatened by anti-intellectual criticism, nationalist
ideologies, and racist politics.21 For Marton, this context defined the broader goal of his article:
“An institution under attack must reexamine its foundations, restate its objectives, seek out its
rationale. Crisis invites self-appraisal…A tower of ivory becomes untenable when its walls are
under assault”22.
While encountering criticism,23 Merton’s four norms of science remains central for the
definition of science: Universalism – the acceptance or rejection of scientific claims should be
based on impersonal criteria, communism – the fruits of science should not be privately owned,
disinterestedness ― the fundamental function of science is to advance knowledge, and
organized skepticism ― scientific knowledge is continuously subjected to the scientific
community’s test. This section focuses on the latter two.
Disinterestedness means that, through the presence of institutional controls, such as peer
review, publication, and replication of research results, the potential distortion by individual
motivation is being filtered out. Conversely, if the accountability of scientists to their peers is
diminished or eroded by ideological or economic forces, a real and damaging loss of scientific
integrity and objectivity will result. According to Merton,24 “There is a competition in the realm
of science, competition which is intensified by the emphasis on priority as a criterion of
achievement, and under competitive conditions there may well be generated incentives for
eclipsing rivals by illicit means. But such impulses can find scant opportunity for expression
in the field of scientific research. Cultism, informal cliques, prolific but trivial publications –
these and other techniques may be used for self-aggrandizement”.25
Organized skepticism is interrelated with all the other Merton’s norms. Organized skepticism
should be both regarded as a methodologic and an institutional mandate. According to Merton,
organized skepticism is “The suspension of judgment until ‘the facts are at hand’ and the
detached scrutiny of beliefs in terms of empirical and logical criteria have periodically involved
science in conflict with other institutions”. 26 In other words, the scientific method, to study
both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ (social) sciences, require facts free from preconceived prejudice.27
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Still nowadays researchers dwell on the scientific method and on the nature of research. In
doing so, scientists inevitably engage with Merton’s norms. Related to Merton’s norm of
organized skepticism, Ketokivi and Choi explain that one of the primary features of scientific
research is transparency. This means that, to be able to evaluate the merits of an argument, a
scientist needs to have access both to “the logic that generates the conclusion and the premises
that support it.”28 They focus on operational management, still clarifying that their
considerations can apply to other social sciences, like law, and they criticize much of existing
literature based on case-study analysis because these types of studies often do not properly
disclose and acknowledge the theoretical framework that underpin them. Instead, in order to
achieve transparency, researchers need to explain how and why they set up the premises of
their case-studies.29 Ketokivi and Choi’s work engages with organized skepticism, because,
just as Merton, they stress the need for science research to advance knowledge. It goes without
saying that when a plethora of case-studies do not achieve transparency, they cannot properly
be challenged and reproduced by the scientific community.
Related to disinterestedness, Succi and Coveney tackle the methodologic issues related to Big
Data, which is also at the core of this paper. The authors highlight that, for some, the amount
of data that can be stored, combined with the use of Artificial Intelligence to find patterns in
these data, seems to make the research methods obsolete. According to this view, with enough
data anything can be inferred, correlation replace causation and there is no need for scientists
developing models and general theories to explain these patterns.30 In particular, Succi and
Coveney highlight the commercial use of Big Data analysis, which is done to increase sales
and, we add, without complying with Merton’s norm of disinterestedness. The authors
counterpose those views by explaining the relation between data, information, knowledge and
wisdom. They claim that data need to be contextualized to draw information from it,
consequently information needs to be analyzed to infer knowledge and such a knowledge can
be understood through hypothesizing a model to explain its cause. Finally, the wisdom gained
in this process can be used to optimize the model by starting the process again.31 In sum, Succi
and Coveney argue that Big Data and Artificial Intelligence approaches are extremely useful
tools to address scientific problems. But researchers still need theories to make sense of what
it is discovered through Big Data analysis.32
In drawing from Merton’s concepts of science and liberal democracy, Brown and Guston
highlight that the right to research is not an absolute one, it actually comes with related
obligations. Indeed, the right to research needs to be balanced with the research in question
contribution to democracy.33 The fact that Big Data and Artificial Intelligence enable the
pursue of certain inquiries, does not mean there is no need to question whether such enquiries
should be done, i.e. what their social benefits are. Big Data is a great research tool, but indeed,
it is just a tool, not a scientific method per se. To become a scientific method, Big Data analysis
needs to be coupled with a theoretical framework to actually produce knowledge and fulfil
science’s moral goals.
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Already in the 1960s, Merton describe the ‘Technical Man’ as fascinated by the technological
advancement and constantly eager to find the best way to standardize and quantify phenomena.
But Merton warned scientists not to fall in the trap of extreme fascination with technological
tools. In the forward to Ellul’s The Technological Society, Merton writes: “It is not a question
of minimizing the importance of scientific activity, but of recognizing that in fact scientific
activity has been superseded by technical activity to such a degree that we can no longer
conceive of science without its technical outcome…science has become an instrument of
technique”.34 In line with Merton’s considerations, we argue that the dissociation between the
technological tool to gather empirical data and the theoretical framework to understand such
data raises ethical questions on Big Data analysis.
Part III – Artificial Intelligence, Big Data and Ethics
Big data can be defined based on large volumes of extensively varied data that are generated,
captured, and processed at high velocity.35 Big data and its analysis are at the centre of modern
science and business,36 and can be beneficial to humans in multiple fields like healthcare,37
business, 38 e-commerce, e-government, science, and security.39 According to Gunther et. al.40,
the opportunities arising from big data analytics for organizations are considered pivotal; big
data has been described as, “the mother lode of disruptive change in a networked business
environment”.41
At the same time, Big Data analysis is a growing ethical concern, and there are not yet rigorous
parameters for ethical research. Mittelstadt and Floridi identified five major ethical themes,
through content meta-analysis, that emerged from the literature: informed consent, privacy,
ownership, epistemology, and the ‘Big Data divide';42 They conclude, “As is often the case
with emerging technologies and sciences, a tendency has been recognized to overemphasize
the potential benefits of Big Data as a means of explaining ‘everything’, perhaps without the
need for theories or frameworks of understanding”.43
Furthermore, according to Crawford, “Data fundamentalism,” or the idea that “correlation
always indicates causation, and that massive data sets and predictive analytics always reflect
34
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objective truth” are influencing the public, mass media and researchers in a problematic
way.44 Practitioners are more concerned with communicating how ‘good’ or ‘responsible’
they are, Mittelstadt and Floridi argue, rather than investigating what these concepts mean in
the context of specific Big Data practices; “Such broad brush attitudes towards Big Data
should be avoided if its ethical implications are to be given serious consideration throughout
the life of emerging Big Data practices, products and applications”. 45 Finally, Metcalf and
Crawford argue that there are growing discontinuities between the research practices of data
science and established tools of research ethics regulation.46
Based on Merton’s norms, the background above and given the specific field of legal research
we have identified two major problems relating to the ethical conduct of Big Data research.
First, existing code of academic research conduct do not properly cover the ethical issue raised
by Big Data,47 and second, Big Data approaches analyze a variety of public records with the
misleading assumption that because this data is already public, it pose minimal risk to the
human subjects.48 These two aspects are addressed in turn.
First, there has been some international attempts to codify a body of norms that enhance
academic research ethics. In 2010, at the Second World Conference on Research Integrity, with
hundreds of attendees, the Singapore Statement of Research Integrity was drafted, aimed to
promote an agreed standard of ethical conduct among researchers around the world. The
Singapore Statement is based upon four founding principles of honesty, accountability,
professionalism and stewardship, and it propones a number of key responsibilities for research.
Because these statements were drafted nearly a decade ago, they do not take into consideration
ethical issues related to Big Data and Artificial Intelligence analysis. However, there are two
responsibilities that are particularly relevant to our discussion. One is research methods:
“Researchers should employ appropriate research methods, base conclusions on critical
analysis of the evidence, and report findings and interpretations fully and objectively.”49 And
the other is societal considerations: “Researchers and research institutions should recognize
that they have an ethical obligation to weigh societal benefits against risks inherent in their
work.”50 We argue that much of the legal research conducted using Artificial Intelligence do
not comply with these two principles because the stewardship of legal experts is lacking.
Second, the European Union has codified a body of rules on data protection, in the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Bennett and Bailey argued that the GDPR contains a more
accurate and faithful expression of the various policy instruments that currently comprise the
'governance of privacy',51 while Zarsky contends that among the challenges data protection law

44

K. Crawford, ‘The Hidden Biases in Big Data’ (Harvard Business Review, 2013).
http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/04/the-hidden-biases-in-big-data/ accessed on May 22, 2019
45
Mittelstadt and Floridi (n Error! Bookmark not defined.).
46
Jacob Metcalf and Kate Crawford, ‘Where are Human Subjects in Big Data Research? The Emerging Ethics
Divide’ (2016) 3(1) Big Data & Society <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2053951716650211>
accessed on May 22, 2019.
47
See also C. Christians, ‘Religious Perspective on Communication Technology’ (1997) 1(1) Journal of Media
and Religion 37, 43.
48
Metcalf and Crawford (n 46).
49
David B. Resnik and Adil E. Shamoo, ‘The Singapore Statement on Research Integrity’ (2011) 18(2) Account
Res. 71.
50
Ibid.
51
Colin J. Bennett and Robin M. Bayley, ‘Privacy Protection in the Era of 'Big Data': Regulatory Challenges and
Social Assessments’ in Bart van der Sloot, Dennis Broeders and Erik Schrijvers (eds) Exploring The Boundaries
of Big Data (Amsterdam University Press 2016) 212.

7

faces in the digital age, the emergence of Big Data is perhaps the greatest.52 Moreover, as part
of the GDPR's drafting process, companies engaged in Big Data voiced their concerns
regarding the GDPR provisions impact on their business. 53
Article 5 of the GDPR postulates the data minimization principle, which is that data collected
shall be “adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for
which they are processed”. 54 It was argued that the clash between the data minimization
principle and the practices of Big Data analysis is intuitive,55 and even that the business model
of Big Data is antithetical to the principle of data minimization.56 This seems to be the case
with ethical research using Big Data.
Big Data analysis not only poses risk deriving from how the data is gathered, but also on the
basis of how this data is analyzed.57 In other words, the fact that Big Data is gathered from the
public domain, does not mean that any type of research can (or should) be done with it. We
share Walther’s view that there is the need for the presumption that “research must hold
promise of advancing knowledge in order to justify any intrusion on human subjects”,58 If the
research does not produce benefit, the inconvenience created to the human subject is not
justifiable.59 By using the GDPR’s language, researcher needs to bear in mind the principle of
data minimization when conducting Big Data analysis. Even though Big Data is publicly
available, only the data that is useful and beneficial for the pursue of knowledge should be
used. It goes without saying that when the theoretical framework is not properly posed, and the
research question is not carefully juxtaposed to the society goals of the research in question,
the principle of data minimization cannot be fulfilled.
Metcalf and Crawford correctly point out that part of the reason why Big Data analysis is
ethically problematic relies on the fact that often researchers who use Big Data analysis are
computer scientists, applied mathematicians and statisticians, who have not historically
engaged in research conducted on human-subjects. 60 Arguably, this historical condition makes
them less aware of the possible harm to the human subject that (unwillingly and unknowingly)
‘participate’ in their studies. The next part provides few examples of case studies on legal issues
conducted without legal scholar stewardship. Various problems are highlighted.
Part IV - Examples and Analysis
Chen, Halberstam and Yu focused their study on extraneous factors in courtrooms
and analyzed how the tone of the voice of male lawyers effect the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States (SCOPUS). The authors use Artificial
Intelligence to identify patterns and they claim that lawyers are statistically more
likely to win a case when their voice is perceived as less masculine. The authors do
52
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not aim to establish any causal connection between male lawyers’ tone of voice and
SCOPUS decisions. However, they claim that “our findings suggest that vocal
characteristics may be relevant in even as solemn a setting as the Supreme Court of
the United States.”61 With their study, the authors test whether there is a correlation
between lawyers’ voices and SCOTUS outcomes. Once they do establish this
correlation, they leave to future studies to “determine the causal mechanisms behind
such relationships.”62
Even though the authors emphasize that their goal is not to advance any claim on the causal
connection between lawyers’ voice and SCOPUS adjudications, this study is highly
problematic. Even though the data analyzed by the three authors is publicly available, this data
is attached to human beings who are involved in the study unknowingly. This alone would be
problematic from an ethical point of view. But in addition to that there is the fact that the
authors of the study do not clarify the reasons for their analysis and they do not specify the
benefit that society would acquire form the inconvenience create to the ‘participants’. Because
these aspects are not specified, the research contravenes the data minimization principle and
its interference with the human subjects is unjustifiable. Moreover, the authors do not really
contribute to advancement of knowledge. They simply run the algorithm to establish a
correlation between two factors, and delegate other to find a meaning for their own inquiry. It
is not clear what is the ‘why’ of this study. Which therefore lacks transparency and does not
comply with Merton’s organized skepticism. This is because lacking an explanation of the
premises and of the logic of the study, the analysis is not replicable. Therefore, it appears clear
that this article does not contribute to knowledge and it does not fulfil science societal duty,
making the study a waste of time and resources.
This, in turn, implies that the research is lacking in Merton’s Disinterestedness since the
potential distortion by individual motivation has not been filtered out. Therefore, since the
accountability of scientists to their peers is diminished or eroded by ideological or economic
forces (Ellul’s ‘Technology Man’), a real and damaging loss of scientific integrity and
objectivity will result. As Merton63 states, “Cultism, informal cliques, prolific but trivial
publications – these and other techniques may be used for self-aggrandizement”,64 in the
scientific competition.
In a similar study, Danziger, Levav and Avnaim-Pesso research how external factors influence
judges’ decisions. The authors focused on judges’ two daily food breaks, and on the three
decision sessions that result from the segmentation of the deliberations of the day. The authors
find that in each session, favorable rulings drop gradually from ≈65% to nearly zero, and then
returns abruptly to ≈65% after each break. In other words, judges are less likely to deny
prisoners’ requests after a food break. The authors claim that: “Our findings suggest that
judicial rulings can be swayed by extraneous variables that should have no bearing on legal
decisions.” 65
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The considerations highlighted in the analysis of the previous paper are valid for this study.
The researchers allow the tool (Artificial Intelligence) to be the protagonist of their study and
relegate the meaning (the legal research) to a secondary position. Again, it is not clear what the
significance of this research is, and consequently, the interference in the life of the judges who
unwillingly ‘participated’ in this research is highly problematic from an ethical point of view.
However, as a point of difference with the previous paper, the researchers of this study hazard
some conclusive considerations that lack enough scientific basis. Indeed, on the one hand they
claim not to aim to provide evidence for a causal connection between food breaks and judges’
decisions, but on the other hand they conclude that: “Nevertheless, our results do indicate that
extraneous variables can influence judicial decisions … our findings support the view that the
law is indeterminate by showing that legally irrelevant situational determinants—in this case,
merely taking a food break—may lead a judge to rule differently in cases with similar legal
characteristics.”66 In doing so, the authors commit one of the most naïve mistakes in scientific
research. They confuse correlation with causation. A similar study, with the stewardship of
legal scholars, would have not fall in such a gross mistake.
Furthermore, Li et al. propose a quantitative and unbiased approach to analyze judicial opinions
that are published without indicating individual authorship. The authors claim that the analysis
is needed because United States courts often publish judicial opinions on highly controversial
issues without disclosing the authorship. They further argue that the anonymity of these judicial
opinions impairs the accountability and transparency of the judicial system, and it deprives
scholars, political commentators and electors of valuable information. By using a data set of
SCOPUS decisions, Li et al. run natural language processers to predict authorship of judicial
opinions. The authors provide an illustrative example by applying their process to the
Obamacare decision, “in which the authorship of a joint dissent was subject to significant
popular speculation. We conclude with a chart predicting the author of every unsigned per
curiam opinion during the Roberts Court.”67
Li et al.’s study is a clear and dangerous example of how Big Data can be used to infer
information. As highlighted in part III of this paper, there is a general misunderstanding that
since information is available to the public, using it do not produce harm to the human subject
of the study. The example of Li et al.’s study highlights how this assumption is misguided. We
acknowledge that there is an interest in discovering the authorship of judicial opinions, and that
the lack of authorship impair accountability. However, we also have to acknowledge that the
case analyzed by the paper (Obamacare) is a very controversial and delicate one, where the
author of the judicial opinion has probably desired to conceal their identity for practical, and
understandable reasons. The authors did not ask the human subject whether they wanted to
participate in the study and, in outing them, the authors expose them to unnecessary harm. This
is a clear example of the fact that only because the technology apt to undergo a certain research
exists, it does not mean that researchers have the right to use it. The right to conduct research
is not an absolute one, and it needs to be juxtaposed with society interests, and, in particular,
the interests of the ‘participants’ of the study.
There are many other studies that can be briefly analyzed. A couple of further examples are
Verma, Parthasarathy and Chen’s study, which uses machine learning techniques to find
patterns in cases in the United States courts of appeals that contribute in determining dissent.
The authors identify some factors that determine dissent, such as the length of the opinion, the
number of citations in the opinion, the voting valence, and how judges sit together. From this
66
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discovery, the authors indicate that when these factors meet some thresholds, they can be used
to predict dissent. They conclude that: “From our results, this implies that judges who write
opinions in a similar manner and sit together often are more likely to agree, while longer
opinions, opinions with more citations in them, and the valence all contribute to determining
when judges dissent.”68 Moreover, Katz, Bommarito, and Blackman use machine learning to
construct a model designed to predict SCOPUS behavior in a generalized, out-of-sample
context. Using data available prior to decision, the authors create a model able to predict more
than 240,000 justice votes and 28,000 cases outcomes between 1816 and 2015. They highlight
that their model can be used to predict future decisions. The authors conclude in saying: “We
encourage additional applied machine learning research directed to these areas and new areas
where the application of predictive analytics might be fruitful. At its core, our effort relies upon
a statistical ensemble method used to transform a set of weak learners into a strong learner.”69
We also encourage the use of Artificial Intelligence and machine learning to analyze courts’
decisions. But we stress the need for a solid understanding of the law, and a clear statement of
the benefit that potential new investigation would bring before embarking on these analyses.
These examples illustrates the alarming process which the legal discipline is undergoing
through the use of Artificial Intelligence; just the same As Merton warns with regard to the
discipline of economy: “The intellectual discipline of economics itself becomes technicized.
Technical economic analysis is substituted for the older political economy included in which
was a major concern with the moral structure of economic activity. Thus doctrine is converted
into procedure. In this sphere as in others, the technicians form a closed fraternity with their
own esoteric vocabulary. Moreover, they are concerned only with what is, as distinct from what
ought to be.”70
Conclusion
In this paper we argue that Artificial Intelligence is a valuable tool to advance legal research.
However, the ‘Technical Man’ should not fall in the trap of extreme fascination with
technology. Technology is a tool to conduct research, but not a research methodology on itself.
By providing examples from the literature on legal research supported by Artificial Intelligence
tools, this paper has explained that the use of Artificial Intelligence to conduct research should
be done with the stewardship of legal scholars. This is for two reasons.
First, as Merton states, “Democratization is tantamount to the progressive elimination of
restraints upon the exercise and development of socially valued capacities”.71 The examples
addressed in part IV do not fulfil science’s goals because it is not clear in which way they
advance knowledge or contribute to society. This is because, if the bases of the scientific
methods are not respected ― the problem is clearly stated and understood, the logical premises
of the study are explained and the reasons for undertaking a certain research are highlighted ―
research loses its meaning. The examples provided in part IV showcase a number of instances
in which researchers have used Artificial Intelligence to conduct legal research enquiries
without explaining the reasons and the rationale for their research. What we are left with is a
68
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plethora of sterile studies which do not aim to advance knowledge, rather they are only meant
to showcase the technology used. In our opinion, similar studies would have been much more
meaningful, and they would have produces useful knowledge, if they were conducted with the
support of legal scholars.
Second, because the research questions are not clear, and the social benefits are overlooked,
the interference of the researchers in the life of the (unknowing) ‘participants’ is unnecessary
and unjustifiable. The examples provided in part IV do not comply with the data minimization
principle proposed in the GDPR, and in general, miss the mark in relation to ethical conduct
for research involving human participants. Most notably, the case study conducted by Li et al.
expose judges to potential harm by outing their controversial opinions on Obamacare.
Computer scientists and applied mathematics scholars, who usually conduct the studies
analyzed in part IV, are not historically engaged in research on human subjects, and they also
seem to imply that, because data is publicly available, they do not harm the human participants.
This is a misguided assumption. The collaboration between computer and mathematics
scientists and legal scholars will be useful to overcome some of the ethical issues discussed.
Merton wrote his work in 1942, almost 80 years ago. Ellul wrote his almost 60 years ago. And
yet, their warning seems to be more relevant than ever in our age of Artificial Intelligence and
Big Data. We urge the academia to “reexamine its foundations, restate its objectives, seek out
its rationale”,72 to use Merton’s words. What we have discussed in this paper is a sign of crisis
that ‘invites self-appraisal’. The ‘Technology Man’ is assaulting the tower of ivory which in
turn becomes untenable.

72

Ibid 115.

12

